Education, Corruption and the Natural Resource Curse by Aladave Ruiz, Max Iván & Garcìa-Peñalosa, Cecilia
Education, Corruption and the Natural Resource Curse
Max Iva´n Aladave Ruiz, Cecilia Garc`ıa-Pen˜alosa
To cite this version:
Max Iva´n Aladave Ruiz, Cecilia Garc`ıa-Pen˜alosa. Education, Corruption and the Natural
Resource Curse. 2008. <halshs-00340997>
HAL Id: halshs-00340997
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00340997
Submitted on 24 Nov 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
        GREQAM 
   Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
 
Document de Travail 
         n°2008-45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EDUCATION, CORRUPTION AND THE 
NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE 
 
 
 
     Max Iván Aldave Ruiz  
 
Cecilia García-Peñalosa 
  
 
 
 
 
 
November 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education, Corruption and the Natural Resource Curse * 
 
 
 
 
     Max Iván ALDAVE RUIZ  
GREQAM and Central Bank of Peru 
 
 
Cecilia GARCÍA-PEÑALOSA a 
GREQAM and CNRS 
 
November 2008 
 
 
Abstract: The empirical evidence on the determinants of growth across countries 
has found that growth is lower when natural resources are abundant, corruption 
widespread and educational attainment low. An extensive literature has examined 
the way in which these three variables can impact growth, but has tended to 
address them separately. In this paper we argue that corruption and education are 
interrelated and that both crucially depend on a country’s endowment of natural 
resources. The key element is the fact that resources affect the relative returns to 
investing in human and in political capital, and, through these investments, output 
levels and growth. In this context, inequality plays a key role both as a 
determinant of the possible equilibria of the economy and as an outcome of the 
growth process. 
 
 
 
  JEL classification numbers:  O11,O13, O15. 
 
Key words: natural resources, corruption, human capital, growth, 
inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a Corresponding author: GREQAM, Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, F-13002 Marseille, 
France. email: cecilia.garcia-penalosa@univmed.fr 
* We are grateful to seminar participants at GREQAM for useful suggestions. 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1. Introduction  
The last two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in the theory and empirics of 
economic growth. One of the key questions has been to try to understand what prevents 
growth and economic development, leaving countries locked in a poverty trap. The 
empirical literature has identified three factors that seem to be systematically correlated 
with poor economic performance: low educational attainment in the population, 
widespread corruption, and abundant natural resources.1 At the same time, a number of 
empirical studies have shown that these three factors are also interrelated. Glaser et al. 
(2004) obtain a negative correlation between education and corruption, Sala-i-Martín and 
Subramanian (2003) find that natural resources tend to reduce a country’s institutional 
quality, while Gylfason (2001) shows that in countries where natural resources are 
abundant educational attainment tends to be low.  
Surprisingly, the theoretical literature has generally considered these three factors 
separately, or at best in pairs. On the one hand, a number of authors have addressed how 
corruption and education are jointly determined and their impact on output levels; see 
Ehrlich and Lui (1999), de la Croix and Delavallade (2008) and Eicher, García-Peñalosa 
and van Ypersele (2008). On the other, a growing literature has shown that the abundance 
of natural resources can result in poor institutions which lead to rent-seeking, political 
mismanagement, or conflict across population groups, with disastrous consequences for 
growth; see Baland and François (2000), Caselli (2006), Hodler (2006), Robinson, Torvik 
and Verdier (2006).  In this paper we combine these two strands of the literature and 
argue that natural resources affect both education and corruption, implying the co-
movements between these three variables observed in the data. 
We develop an endogenous growth model with unskilled individuals that can 
work in the industrial or in the natural resource sector, and skilled agents that work in the 
industrial sector only. There are two key assumptions in our analysis. The first one is that 
it is easier for the political class to appropriate the rents stemming from natural resource 
extraction than from other types of activity. Natural resources are generally owned by the 
                                                 
1 See Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) on education, Mauro (1995), Tanzi and Davoodi 
(2002), and Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) on corruption, and Sachs and Warner (1999), Bravo-Ortega and 
De Gregorio (2005), Leite and Weideman (2002), and Isham, Woolkock, Pritchett and Busby (2005) on 
natural resources and growth.  
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state and this gives rise to poorly defined property rights which enable the appropriation 
of rents. In our model we take this idea to the extreme and assume that while the 
industrial sector is immune to rent seeking, the rents generated by the resource sector can 
be appropriated by those who invest in political capital. A larger endowment of resources 
hence increases potential rents and thus the incentives to invest in political capital. The 
second central element in our analysis is the trade-off between investing in human capital 
or in political capital examined by Ehrlich and Lui (1999). Skilled individuals can devote 
a fraction of their time endowment to accumulating human capital or to accumulating 
political capital. The more others invest in human capital, the higher the return from this 
investment is for an individual.  
 This complementarity between human capital investments across individuals 
gives rise to multiple equilibria. The economy may exhibit a high-growth equilibrium, 
with no corruption, high human capital investments and fast growth; a low-growth 
equilibrium with investments in the two types of capital and a low growth rate; or a 
poverty trap where skilled individuals devote all their time to acquiring political capital, 
so that there is no industrial production, no human capital accumulation and no growth. 
The level of natural resources is the crucial parameter determining which of these 
equilibria exist. For low levels of resources only the high-growth equilibrium exists, 
while for high levels the poverty trap is the unique outcome. Intermediate resource 
endowments imply the coexistence of the high-growth equilibrium and one of the other 
two. 
Our model extends the analysis of Ehrlich and Lui (1999) by introducing natural 
resources and heterogeneity across agents, with important implications. In their model, a 
growth equilibrium and a poverty trap coexist for all parameter values, implying that 
which equilibrium prevails is a question only of coordination. This makes policy 
recommendations particularly difficult as the only way of escaping the poverty trap is for 
agents to coordinate on the good equilibrium, and it is unclear how policy makers can do 
so. In our analysis, multiple equilibria appear when resources are larger than a certain 
threshold, with the threshold being endogenously determined by model parameters. 
Policies that affect these parameters can then switch the economy to a different 
equilibrium. A key parameter is the degree of inequality in access to human and political 
 
 
 
 
3
capital. In particular, the larger the fraction of the population that can invest in political 
capital, the smaller the payoff to rent-seeking is, which increases the range of values of 
natural resources for which the high-growth equilibrium is unique. In other words, 
policies that increase access to the political system can have a major effect on economic 
performance.  
The paper adds to the literature trying to understand why is it that the abundance 
of natural resources tends to be associated with poor economic performance, the so-called 
“resource curse”.  The argument initially proposed was that natural resources resulted in a 
Dutch disease,2 but more recent work has emphasized how resources result in poor 
governance and bad institutions. Both Caselli (2006) and Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 
(2006) maintain that because abundant resources raise the payoff to being in power, 
incumbent politicians will attempt to remain in power through inefficient redistribution or 
by reducing productive expenditures in favour of those that increase electoral success. 
Hodler (2006) explores the idea that the presence of resources causes fighting amongst 
rival groups in order to appropriate the rents from natural resources. Baland and François 
(2000) is closely related to our paper in that it considers how natural resources affect the 
allocation of individuals to rent-seeking or to entrepreneurial activities. Their aim is to 
show that, since there are multiple equilibria, a resource boom may increase or reduce 
rent-seeking and output depending on the initial equilibrium, a result we also obtain. 
Their model is, however, static and considers homogeneous agents. As a result it cannot 
derive any implications concerning growth or inequality.  
In contrast to this literature, our analysis gives a prominent role to human capital. 
The idea that resources affect human capital accumulation has been explored by 
Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999). Their model is based on a Dutch disease 
mechanism that affects the price of exports produced with skilled labour and hence output 
in this sector. A learning-by-doing externality implies that the reduction in output in the 
skilled sector will in turn affect human capital accumulation. There are a number of 
differences with our approach. First, given the lack of empirical evidence supporting the 
Dutch disease mechanism, we do not consider it. Second, we use a concept of human 
                                                 
2 Corden and Neary (1992) proposed this argument, but empirical evidence against it is provided by Sachs 
and Warner (1999), amongst others.  
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capital accumulation –formal education- that captures more closely the measures used in 
empirical analyses than learning-by-doing. Third, Gylfason, et al. do not consider rent-
seeking nor allow for agent heterogeneity.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. We solve 
it in section 3, characterizing the three possible equilibria and deriving the natural 
resource thresholds. Section 4 examines the comparative statics of the model, while the 
last section concludes. 
 
2.  Model assumptions 
2.1. Technologies 
We consider a two-sector endogenous growth model. The first sector consists of the 
extraction of natural resources, while the second one produces a manufactured good. 
There exist two types of agents: skilled and unskilled. The population is normalized to 
one, and there are n  skilled workers and 1-n unskilled workers. The manufacturing sector 
employs both types of labour, while the natural resource sector employs only unskilled 
workers. Unskilled labour can move costlessly between the two sectors. The share of 
unskilled labour used in the industrial sector is denoted Stl , while Rtl  denotes the fraction 
of labour in the natural resource sector.  
 The engine of growth is the accumulation of human capital by skilled agents. 
Investment in human capital requires time. Skilled agents have a time endowment of 1 
each period, which can be alternatively used to accumulate human capital, tH , to 
accumulate political capital (denoted by tQ ), or to produce output. Let th  denote the 
amount of time spent accumulating human capital and tq  that spent accumulating 
political capital, so that tt qh −−1  is time spent at work. The stock of human (political) 
capital of an individual at time t+1 is a function on his stock of human (political) capital 
at t and of the time devoted to accumulation. They are, respectively, given by   
     ttt hAHH =+1       (1) 
    ttt qBQQ =+1       (2) 
where A and B are positive constants. We suppose that unskilled individuals cannot 
accumulate neither human nor political capital 
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 There is no physical capital in the economy, hence there are three inputs: the two 
types of labour and natural resources. The manufacturing technology uses unskilled 
labour and human capital, with output in this sector being produced according to a 
constant returns technology of the form 
    [ ] αα −−−= 1)1( SttttSt lqhnHY ,    (3) 
where 10 <<α . We further suppose that the productivity of the skilled is sufficiently 
large, specifically that n>α , which, as we will see, ensures that the wage of the 
unskilled is lower than that of the skilled.  
Output in the natural resource sector depends on the level of unskilled 
employment and the stock of natural resources, R , which is given and constant over 
time.3 We suppose that output in this sector is also given by a constant returns technology 
of the form   
 αα −= 1RttRt lRaY      (4) 
where ta  is the level of technology in the resource sector at time t. This sector benefits 
from an externality arising from the human capital accumulated by skilled workers. In 
particular, we assume that αtt aHa = , implying that ααα −= 1RttRt lRaHY .  That is, 
although the natural resource sector does not use the factor that can be accumulated 
(human capital) production in this sector grows with human capital.  This technological 
externality is crucial for the resource sector not to disappear in the long run.  It can be due 
to several effects. For example, if we included infrastructure à la Barro (1990), and this 
infrastructure were financed through income taxation, higher levels of human capital 
would increase tax revenue and hence expenditure in infrastructure, which would in turn 
raise productivity in the resource sector.  
 
2.2. Rents and political behaviour 
The two sectors are competitive and workers are paid their marginal product. In the 
manufacturing sector, this implies that output is exhausted by the payment of wages. 
                                                 
3 For simplicity, we assume there is no depletion of natural resources, a reasonable assumption in the 
medium-term. Note that depletion would tend to make the resource sector less productive, and the overall 
effect on the allocation of unskilled labour would then depend on the relative strengths of depletion and the 
technological externality. 
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However, in the natural resource sector, there is a rent, given by RYα . We suppose that 
natural resources are publicly owned, hence firms exploiting them pay the government 
the resulting rents.  
The way in which this revenue is used depends on whether or not there is 
corruption. If there is no investment in political capital (no corruption) the government 
will use the revenue to make lump-sum transfers to all individuals. Each individual –
whether skilled or unskilled- will then get a transfer of RYα  from the government.4 If 
there is investment in political capital (corruption), skilled individuals will appropriate 
the whole revenue from the natural resource sector net of the wage paid to the unskilled. 
We suppose that the revenue from the natural resource sector is distributed among the 
skilled according to the size of each individual’s political capital relative to the average 
political capital stock of the society, *tQ , as in Ehrlich and Lui (1999). We can then 
express the total income of a corrupt individual as  
     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++= *ln1
t
tRtSt
ct Q
Q
n
Y
n
Yy αα    (5)   
where the first term is the income he gets from working in the manufacturing sector and 
the second captures the rents from corruption.  
 We further suppose that, at each period, there is a monetary cost associated to 
being corrupt. The cost of taking part in corruption activities includes the monetary costs 
of political participation, as well as direct expenses such as bribes or the administrative 
costs of concealing income. It can also be interpreted as the expected loss or fine incurred 
by the individual if detected and punished. We can think of this cost as being directly 
related to the quality of institutions, with better institutions increasing the cost of 
concealing income and/or increasing the penalty when caught. The cost is assumed to be 
proportional to the total revenue of the individual, and is given by ctzy , where 10 << z .5  
 
 
                                                 
4 Examples of this are the Fund of the Petroleum of Norway and the Alaska Permanent Fund. 
5 An alternative assumption would have been to make the cost proportional only to corruption rents. This 
would not have made any qualitative difference to our results, although the derivations would be more 
cumbersome. 
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2.3. Households 
We assume that agents are infinitely-lived and maximize the following utility function:   
       ∑∞
=
−=
1
1 log
t
t
t cU β     (6) 
where 1<β  is the discount factor. For the unskilled, income is given by the unskilled 
wage and, if there is no corruption, government transfers. For the skilled, it is equal to 
their total income net of the monetary cost of being corrupt.   
Let φ  be an indicator function such that: 
     ⎩⎨
⎧
>
==
0   1
0   0
)(
qif
qif
qφ    
Since there is no physical capital, all agents consume all their income at each period in 
time. We can then express the consumption of a skilled individual as  
( ) Rtct
t
tRtSt
st YzyQ
Q
n
Y
n
Yc αφαφα −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++= 1ln1 * .  (7) 
Since all skilled agents are identical, in equilibrium *tQ = tQ . Using this expression and 
substituting (5) in (7) we obtain the level of consumption of a skilled individual at time t,    
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+−= RtStst Yn
zY
n
zc φφφα )1(11 ,    (7’)   
which clearly depends on whether or not there is corruption. Unskilled consumption is, in 
turn, given by ( ) RtRtRtut YlYc αφα −+−= 1/)1( , where the first term is the wage received 
by the unskilled and the second the (possible) redistribution. 
      
3. A Dynamic Model of Corruption   
3.1. Labour market equilibrium   
There are two equilibrium allocations in the model. On the one hand, unskilled workers 
decide whether to work in the manufacturing or in the resource sector. The allocation 
across the two sectors will yield the static allocation condition that determines output for 
a given stock of human capital. On the other, skilled workers decide how two allocate 
their time between the three possible activities: production, human capital investment, 
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and the accumulation of political capital. This dynamic allocation will determine the rate 
of growth of human capital and hence future output. 
 The mobility of unskilled workers across the two sectors of the economy implies 
the equality of the unskilled wage in the manufacturing and natural resource sectors. 
Together with the market clearing condition, nll RS −=+ 1 , this yields  
    
)1(
)1(
/1
/1
tt
Rt qhnRa
Ran
l −−+
−= α
α
    (8a) 
    
)1()1(
)1)(1(
/1
tt
tt
St qhnRan
qhnnl −−+−
−−−= α    (8b) 
Clearly, 0/ >∂∂ tRt ql  and 0/ <∂∂ tSt ql . Greater investment in political capital reduces 
the time that skilled individuals spend working in the industrial sector. This lowers the 
productivity of the unskilled in manufacturing and induces a flow of unskilled workers 
from this sector to the natural resource sector. That is, an increase in the time spent 
accumulating political capital reduces the size of the manufacturing sector and increases 
that of the natural resource sector. 
     
3.2. The decision to accumulate political capital   
A skilled individual will invest in political capital whenever the rents that he can capture 
through political power are greater than the costs associated to political participation, 
taking as given the actions of other skilled individuals. That is, 0>q  if and only if 
ctRt zynY >/α . Substituting for the production functions and using (8) we find that the 
agent accumulates political capital if and only if  
       α/1)1(
1
),(ˆ −−−−≡> aqhnz
zqhRR tttt .    (9)   
This expression implies that the individual is willing to invest in political capital only if 
natural resources are abundant, that is, if they are above a threshold level Rˆ . We can 
immediately see that the higher the cost of political participation, z , the higher is the 
natural resource threshold required for individuals to chose to be corrupt. Furthermore, Rˆ  
is also a function of h and q. The reason for this is that the output of the natural resource 
sector, and hence the rents obtained by corrupt individuals, depend on the level of 
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unskilled employment in the sector. Lower values of both h and q increase the time 
devoted by skilled individuals to production and thus the marginal product of unskilled 
labour in the manufacturing sector, reducing employment and hence rents in the resource 
sector for a given level of R.  
 The allocation of time across activities is, however, endogenous and hence we 
need to evaluate the threshold once we have determined the investments in human and 
political capital. As we will see, this dependence of the threshold level of resources on 
agents’ decisions will give rise to multiple equilibria.   
   
3.3. The no-corruption (high-growth) equilibrium  
We start by considering the high growth equilibrium, which is defined as an equilibrium 
in which there are no incentives to accumulate political capital, i.e. 0=q . As we have 
seen, this will occur whenever ),(ˆ tt qhRR ≤ . Setting 0=φ  in equation (7’) we can 
express the consumption of skilled individuals as   
      ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += RtStst Yn
Yc α .      (10)   
   The maximization problem faced by a skilled individual is  
       
( )ααααααα
β
−−−
+
∞
=
−
+−=
=
= ∑
111
1
1
1
,
)1(
..
logmax
RttStttst
ttt
t
st
t
hc
lRalhHnc
hAHHts
cU
        
The first order conditions together with equations (8) yields optimal consumption growth,   
     
α
α
αα
β
−
+
−
++ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+
−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
1
/1
/11
11
)1(
)1(
t
t
t
t
st
st
hnRa
hnRa
H
HA
c
c .   (11)   
From equation (10), and noting that in steady state htt hhh ==+1  and Stl  and Rtl  are 
constant, we can write steady-state consumption growth as α)1(1 gcc stst +=+ , where 
1/1 −≡ + tt HHg  is the rate of growth of human capital. Substituting this expression in 
(11), we obtain that in the high-growth equilibrium the time devoted to human capital 
investment is 
       β=hh ,     (12a) 
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and, from (1), human capital accumulation is given by 
     Agh β=+1 .     (12b) 
It is then straightforward to show from the production function that the steady state rates 
of growth of output and consumption in the high-growth equilibrium are equal to 
Aβα ln . As in Lucas (1988), the more patient the individual and the more productive the 
human capital technology, the faster the rate of growth is.  
For high-growth to be an equilibrium, natural resources must be below the 
threshold level ),(ˆ hh qhR . Evaluating this threshold at the equilibrium time allocation just 
obtained we have 
   )0,(ˆ βRR ≡ ( )βα −−= − 11 /1 naz
z .   (13)   
Then, the high-growth equilibrium exists for all levels of natural resources below R , and 
does not exist for RR > . 
 
3.4. Equilibria with corruption   
The incentive to invest in political capital appears when the level of natural resources is 
sufficiently high for revenues from the appropriation of rents to be greater than the 
private cost of corruption. That is, if ),(ˆ tt qhRR >  then 0,0 ≥> hq . When there is 
corruption, the consumption of the skilled will be 
 ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++−= *ln11
t
t
RtStst Q
QYY
n
zc α .   (14) 
 The maximization problem faced by the individual is then  
( ) .ln1)1(1
..
logmax
*
11
1
1
1
1
,,
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++−−−=
=
=
=
−−
+
+
∞
=
−∑
t
t
RttSttttst
ttt
ttt
t
st
t
qhc
Q
QlRalqhHn
n
zc
qBQQ
hAHHts
cU
ααααααα
β
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The solution to this problem is derived in the appendix. Solving the control problem we 
find the following first order conditions with respect to th  and tq , 
  ( )1
1
11
/1
/11
11 1
)1(
)1(
+
−
++
−
++ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−+
−−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= t
tt
tt
t
t
st
st q
qhnRa
qhnRa
H
HA
c
c
α
α
αα
β ,  (15a)  
  ⎥⎦
⎤+⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−+
−−+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= +
−
++
++
tt
t
tt
tt
t
t
st
st
q
R
n
a
q
q
qhnRa
qhnRa
H
H
c
c
αβ
αα
α
αα /1
1
1
11
/1
/1
11
)1(
)1(
, (15b)    
which equate the ratio of consumption in two periods to the ratio of the returns to 
investment in human capital and in political capital, respectively. From (14), and using 
the fact that since all skilled agents are identical *tt QQ = , we can express the 
consumption ratio as  
   ααααα
αααααα
−−
−
+
−
+++++
+−−
+−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= 11
1
1
1
11111
)1(
)1(
RtSttt
RtSttt
t
t
st
st
laRlqhn
laRlqhn
H
H
c
c .  (16)   
Equations (15a), (15b) and (16) together determine the investment in human capital, the 
investment in political capital, and the time path of consumption.  
 In steady state ltt hhh ==+1  , and ltt qqq ==+1 . Equation (16) then implies that 
the steady state rate of growth of consumption is given, as before, by α)1(1 gcc stst +=+ . 
We can then use this expression to substitute into (15) and obtain the equilibrium values 
of q and h. The interior solution to the individual’s maximization problem can be 
expressed as 
  *R
Rq =  ,     (17a) 
  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= *1 R
Rh β ,     (17b) 
where βαβ α /)1( /1* −−≡ naR . Depending on the value of R, we can have an interior or a 
corner solution, which give rise to two possible equilibria, a low-growth equilibrium and 
a no-growth equilibrium. We examine these in turns. 
   
3.4.1. The low-growth equilibrium   
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The economy will be in a low-growth equilibrium when there are positive investments in 
both human can political capital in every period. The low-growth equilibrium 
investments in political and human capital are  
 R
n
aql β
β
α
α
−= 1
/1
 ,     (18a) 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−= Rn
ahl β
β
αβ
α
1
1
/1
,     (18b) 
while the rate of growth of human capital is given by 
      ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−=+ Rn
aAgl β
β
αβ
α
1
11
/1
.   (18c)   
Clearly,   0/ >∂∂ Rq  and 0/ <∂∂ Rh . A greater endowment of natural resources makes 
rent-seeking behaviour more profitable and hence increases q . This in turn results in a 
reduction of the investment in human capital, which reduces growth. We can also see that 
the greater the number of skilled, n, the greater (smaller) the investment in human 
(political) capital, and the more patient agents are, the greater will be the  investment in 
the political capital.  The effect of β  on human capital investment is ambiguous, as 
greater patience tends to increase it but more investment in political capital tends to 
reduce it. 
 For the low-growth equilibrium to exist, two conditions are needed. First, the 
level of natural resources must be sufficiently high for individuals to invest in political 
capital. That is RR ≥  where  
 αβ
β
)1(
),(ˆ
*
zz
RzqhRR ll −+=≡     (19)   
Second, the level of natural resources must not be so high that individuals invest only in 
political and not in human capital. That is, 0>lh , which from (17b) requires *RR < . We 
can express the two conditions for existence of the low growth equilibrium as 
*RRR << . If *RR ≥ , then 0=h  and the economy will find itself in a poverty trap 
which we next examine.  
   
3.4.2. The poverty trap   
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The economy will fall in a poverty trap when the level of natural resources is so high that 
the incentive to accumulate political capital eliminates all investment in human capital. 
To see this note that since investments in the two types of capital are bounded below by 
zero and above by the time endowment, 1, the solutions to the individual’s maximization 
problem given by (17) imply that for *RR ≥  there is a corner solution of the form 
  1=pq  ,     (20a) 
  0=ph .      (20b) 
This means that in this equilibrium, skilled individuals devote all their time to 
accumulating political capital and do not accumulate human capital nor spend time in the 
manufacturing sector. Because there is no investment in human capital, there is no 
growth, and both consumption and human capital remain constant. That is, 0=pg  and  
ptt HHH ==+1 . Moreover, there is no manufacturing production as the skilled devote all 
their time to accumulating political capital. 
       
4. Natural Resource Thresholds and Possible Equilibria   
4. 1. Equilibrium configurations 
In order to understand when each of the equilibria will emerge, we need to consider under 
which ranges of R each of the three possible equilibria exist. Our results above imply that  
• the high-growth equilibrium can exist for all RR ≤ ,  
• the low-growth equilibrium can exist for all  *RRR << , 
• the poverty-trap can exist for all  *RR ≥ .   
The relationship between these three thresholds determines the possibility of existence of 
multiple equilibria. From equations (13) and (19) and the expression for *R , we can see 
that R  will always be smaller than both *R  and R . However, the relationship between 
*R  and R  will depend on the parameters of the model. In particular, *R  will be greater 
than R  if and only if )/( βαα +<z , i.e. if z  is sufficiently small.  
Figures 1 and 2 depict the possible equilibria under the two parameter 
configurations. In both cases, the investment functions in human and political capital 
present a discontinuities at R , and there is an interval where the model exhibits multiple 
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equilibria. Small endowments of natural resources result in high-growth, human capital 
investment and no corruption. For intermediate levels of natural resources, multiple 
equilibria are possible, while for large endowments of natural resources, there is a 
poverty trap with no growth, no human capital, investment, and high corruption. A key 
parameter is the cost of political participation, z. Figure 1 presents the case in which 
)/( βαα +≤z . When the cost is low, a high-growth and a low-growth equilibrium 
coexist for intermediate levels of resources. The case of a high cost, i.e. )/( βαα +>z  is 
depicted in figure 2. The range of values of R  for which a high-growth equilibrium exists 
is greater, and as a result, the high- and low-growth equilibria coexist for *RRR << , 
while the high-growth equilibrium  and the poverty trap coexist for  RRR <≤* . 
These results are the combination of two elements: the interdependence between 
individual q and the size of rents, and the presence of the fixed cost. The interdependence 
is due to the fact that the size of corruption rents obtained by one agent depends on the 
investment in political capital of others. If other skilled individuals spend a large fraction 
of their time accumulating political capital, their time spent in manufacturing falls. As a 
result, unskilled labour flows to the natural resource sector increasing output and rents. In 
the absence of the cost z, this would not be enough to create multiplicity. To see this, note 
that when z=0, 0== RR , implying that the high-growth equilibrium does not exist, and 
that there are only two possible configurations: a low-growth equilibrium when resources 
are below *R  and a poverty trap when resources are above this threshold.6 A positive 
value of z makes the high-growth equilibrium possible. Since there is a fixed cost of 
corruption, an individual will only acquire political capital if the rents are high enough, 
i.e. if others are investing sufficiently in political capital. The higher the cost, the greater 
is the range over which the high-growth equilibrium exists. For z=1, ∞=R  and =R *R , 
implying that the high-growth equilibrium and the poverty trap coexist for the entire 
range of possible values of R. 
  
                                                 
6 This is the configuration found in Ehrlich and Lui (1999), where there is no equilibrium without 
corruption. 
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Figure 1: Equilibria with low z ( )/( βαα +≤z ) 
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Figure 2: Equilibria with high z ( )/( βαα +>z ) 
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4.2. Comparative statics 
We can now compare the features of the three equilibria, which are summarized in Table 
1.7 Greater human capital accumulation is associated with faster growth and lower levels 
of corruption. There are also static losses associated with corruption, as the investment in 
political capital diverts resources away from manufacturing production and reduces 
aggregate output at any point in time, as can be seen by comparing the output levels 
reported in the fifth line.  
  
Table 1: Characterisation of the equilibria 
 High growth Low growth Poverty trap 
Natural 
resources 
RR ≤  *RRR <<  *RR ≥  
Human 
capital  
β=hh  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= *1 R
Rhl β  0=ph  
Political 
capital 
0=hq  *R
Rql =  1=pq  
Growth 
of H 
1−= Agh β  11 * −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
R
RAgl β  0=pg  
Aggregate 
output 
α
αα
α
β ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−= − *1)1( RRHnaYh  ( ) ααα αβ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −+−= − RRRHnaYl *1)1(  
ααα RHnaYp
−−= 1)1(
 
 
Inequality 
( )
*
*
)1()1(
)1(
RRn
RnRn
n
Ih βααα
βαα
−+−
+−=  )1(1
1
z
n
nIl −−−= α
α  )1(1
1
z
n
nI p −−−= α
α
 
 
Natural resources have two effects: a direct effect on output, given the type of 
equilibrium, and an impact on the feasible equilibria. As discussed in the previous 
section, small endowments imply that only the high-growth equilibrium exists, 
intermediate endowments result in the coexistence of a high-growth and a low-
growth/poverty-trap equilibria, while for large endowments the economy will find itself 
in a poverty trap. The direct effect of resources is, however, ambiguous. Conditional on 
                                                 
7 The expressions for inequality presented in Table 1 are derived in section 4.3 below. 
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being in the high-growth equilibrium, resources are a “blessing”. Total output in this 
equilibrium is given by  ( )ααα αβ /)1( *1 RRHnaYh +−= −  and hence increasing in R, 
although the growth rate is unaffected by the level of resources. In contrast, in the low-
growth equilibrium, a higher value of R increases corruption, reducing human capital 
accumulation and growth. 
 A crucial parameter in the analysis is, as we have seen, the cost of engaging in 
corruption. The value of z does not affect *R , and hence does not affect the range over 
which the poverty trap exists. A larger z, however, implies higher threshold levels  R  and 
R , which increase the range over which only the high-growth equilibrium exist ( RR ≤ ) 
and that over which it co-exists with other equilibria ( RRR ≤< ). An immediate 
implication of the role played by z in determining the possibility of multiple equilibria is 
that the existence of natural resources in a country does not necessarily lead to a resource 
curse. If the cost of corruption is sufficiently high, multiple equilibria are possible and 
consequently abundant resources are compatible with no corruption.  
Another implication of the analysis is that the presence of natural resources creates 
the possibility of leap-frogging. Consider two otherwise identical economies which differ 
in the level of resources, such that economy A has a low level RRA <  and economy B 
has a large endowment *RRB > . Economy A is hence in the high-growth equilibrium and 
has positive growth, while economy B is in a poverty trap and experiences no growth. If 
B’s endowment is sufficiently large, output will initially be higher in this economy.8 
However, fast growth in country A will allow the latter to catch-up and eventually surpass 
the output of country B. 
 
4.3. Inequality  
There are two concepts of inequality that we can consider: inequality in access to human 
and political capital, captured by the parameter n, and income inequality across the two 
types of agents. Inequality in access is a crucial model parameter. Recall that  
βαβ α /)1( /1* −−≡ naR  and that both R  and R  are proportional to *R . A higher value of 
                                                 
8 The precise condition is αβ /*RRR AB >− . 
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n hence shifts to the right the three thresholds, implying that the range of resources for 
which the high-growth equilibrium exist is larger (due to the increase in R  ) and the 
range for which it is the only possible equilibrium is greater (as R  rises). That is, the 
larger the fraction of the population that has access to investments in human and political 
capital, the more likely a high-growth equilibrium is. The intuition for this result is 
straightforward. Recall that corrupt individuals divide the rents from the sector amongst 
all the skilled. The larger the size of this group is, the lower the rents per capita are, 
making it less likely that corruption pays off. That is, more widespread access to political 
activity reduces the range of natural resources over which corrupt equilibria exist. 
 Heterogeneity across agents also implies that income levels will differ between 
the skilled and the unskilled. Moreover, different equilibria may result in different 
degrees of income inequality. A convenient measure of income inequality is the ratio of 
the income of the skilled to that of the unskilled, which is given by   
    
R
S
S
RRS
Y
l
Y
YY
n
zY
n
z
I
αφα
αφαφφα
)1()1(
)1()1()1(
−+−
−+−+−
= .  (21) 
Income inequality in the high-growth equilibrium and in the equilibria with corruption 
are given, respectively, by 
      *
*
)1/()1(
1
1 RRn
RnR
n
nIh βααα
βα
α
α
+−−
+−
−= ,   (22a)  
      )1(1
1
z
n
nII pl −−−== α
α .      (22b)   
In both expressions the first term ( )1/( αα − ) captures the relative productivity of skilled 
and unskilled workers, while the second term ( nn /)1( − ) captures the relative labour 
supplies, and are standard. A higher relative productivity of the skilled and a lower 
relative supply will tend to increase income inequality. The additional term in (22b), (1-
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z), captures the fact that when there is corruption a fraction of the income of the skilled is 
used to pay for the corruption costs. The higher this cost, the lower income inequality is.9  
 To examine the various elements affecting inequality in the high-growth 
equilibrium, we can express hI  as  
)1(
1
1
)1(1
1 /1
/1
βα
α
β
α
α
α
α
−+−
−
−+−
−= Ra
n
n
Ra
n
nIh .   (23) 
There are two forces affecting inequality in this case. First, in the high-growth 
equilibrium there is a lump-sum transfer to all agents that tends to reduce inequality. The 
larger the size of the natural resource sector is, i.e. the larger R, the stronger this effect is. 
Second, the rate of time preference affects human capital accumulation and hence time 
spent in production, which in turn impacts on inequality. Differentiating, we have 
0/ <∂∂ βhI . A higher rate of time preference increases investments in human capital and 
reduces time spent in production, reducing the labour income of the skilled and hence 
inequality.  
  Inequality in the high-growth equilibrium may be greater or lower than in the 
equilibria with corruption. Inequality will be lower in the high-growth equilibrium if and 
only if 
    )1(11
1
1 /1 βαα
α
−>⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−
− R
z
a
n
nz .   (24) 
There are three forces affecting inequality captured by the parameters R, β , and z. The 
larger the R the stronger the redistributive effect is and the larger β  the lower the wage 
of the skilled, both of which make it more likely that lh II < .  The cost of political 
participation, z, reduces the income of the skilled, and hence inequality, when there is 
corruption. The larger this cost is, the less likely it is that lh II < .  
 
 
                                                 
9 Note that the last term in both inequality expressions is less than 1 and hence we require restrictions on 
parameters to ensure that the wage ratios are greater than one. In particular, 1>lI  requires that 
)/()( nnz ααα −−< , while 1>hI  if and only if Ran >−−− − )1/())(1( /1 ααβ α . 
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5. Concluding Comments 
A wealth of evidence has documented that slow growth and poverty traps tend to be 
associated with low educational attainment, widespread corruption, and abundant natural 
resources. In this paper we have argued that these three aspects are interrelated, and 
proposed a model in which natural resources affect both corruption and education 
decisions, which in turn determine growth. 
We have considered a two-class economy where the skilled have access to the 
accumulation of both human and political capital. Corruption takes the form of individual 
rent-seeking behaviour that appropriates rents from the natural resource sector and which 
becomes possible due to the accumulation of above-average political capital. Corruption 
has both static and dynamic costs. Accumulating political capital reduces time spent in 
production, thus reducing current output, and time spent in education, which reduces 
growth. In this context multiple equilibria emerge: a high-growth equilibrium with no 
corruption, a low-growth equilibrium with accumulation of both human and political 
capital, and a poverty trap with no education investments.  
The possible equilibria crucially depend on natural resources. There exist two 
thresholds such that when resources are below the lower bound only the high-growth 
equilibrium exist, when they are above the upper threshold only the poverty trap is 
possible, while multiplicity appears from intermediate ranges. Moreover, these thresholds 
are endogenous and depend on model parameters. This aspect is crucial for the policy 
recommendations. Existing models of the resource curse tend to be characterized by 
multiplicity for all parameter configurations. As a result, switching from one equilibrium 
to the other requires coordination, something which is difficult to implement by a policy-
maker. In contrast, our setup identifies a number of parameters that will increase the 
range over which a growth equilibrium is unique.  
A crucial parameter in the analysis is inequality in access to human and political 
capital investments, that is, the fraction of the population that is skilled. If this fraction is 
small, per capital rents from corruption are high, making rent-seeking more likely. If, on 
the contrary, this fraction is large the consequent reduction in corruption rents will 
increase the range of resources for which only a high-growth equilibrium exists. As a 
result, increasing access to the political process by the population can allow a country to 
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escape from the poverty trap. Interestingly, income inequality need not move together 
with inequality in access to human capital investments, since the income of the skilled 
relative to the unskilled may be higher or lower in the poverty-trap than in the high-
growth equilibrium.  
The possibility of leap-frogging implied by the model can provide an explanation 
of the different experiences of East Asian and sub-Saharan African economies. In the 
1950s the perception among development economists was that the serious problem was 
faced by East Asia. African countries were resource rich, and natural resources would 
bring in the revenues needed to trigger growth (Hance, 1956); East Asian economies 
were uneducated and resource poor, and hence had no way of escaping the poverty trap. 
Yet, the next few decades witnessed a massive increase in both education and per capita 
incomes in the Asian economies and stagnation in most African countries (Temple, 
1999). Our model suggests that the abundant endowment in natural resources of the latter 
lead to the accumulation of political capital at the expense of human capital, while scarce 
resources created the incentives for the former to invest in education and leap-frog the 
rich African economies. 
The key prediction of our model is that the impact of natural resources operates 
through increased corruption and reduced education. Isham et al. (2005) test the 
hypothesis that the resource curse operates through weak institutions and find support for 
it, identifying a significant effect occurring through corruption. Unfortunately, they treat 
education as an exogenous variable in their system which is strongly correlated with 
corruption. Gylfason (2001) and Gylfason et al. (1999) provide evidence of a significant 
negative correlation between the abundance of resources and education. Their results 
indicate that the resource curse partly operates through this mechanism, although 
resources have a significant effect on growth even when the human capital variable is 
included. Further empirical work is needed to assess whether corruption and education 
are both simultaneously affected by resources and to examine whether accounting for 
these two mechanisms suffices to explain most of the resource curse.  
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APPENDIX 
In this appendix we derive the solution to the skilled workers’ maximization problem. 
The maximization problem is 
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Together with the transversality conditions 
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We then obtain  
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which yield equations (15) in the text. 
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